


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


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
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USSR-Berlin: (The Soviet Union is increasing its efforts to establish direct contacts with West Berlin officials.)

(Moscow's apparent aim is to demonstrate that West Berlin is an independent entity, able to conduct its own affairs with both East and West, and that this makes the occupation status of the city outmoded. Recently, West Berlin officials publicly advocated an expansion of relations with the Communists.)

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(A Soviet official proposed to Acting Mayor Albertz of West Berlin on 1 August that either Albertz or Brandt arrange a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to East Germany. Albertz replied that there was no "formal ground" for such a meeting.)

(In his 5 August conversation with US Ambassador McGhee, Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov also indicated the USSR's desire to increase the range of Soviet activities in West Berlin. Abrasimov protested the Allied refusal to permit Soviet correspondents to reside in West Berlin. He also took exception to Allied obstruction of Soviet plans to build a central complex there.)

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USSR: (Prominent Soviet scientists have recently sought to impress Western scientists with the great difficulties to be encountered in a program for a manned lunar landing.)

(In July 1963 the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences asserted [redacted] that Soviet scientists, for the time being at least, have rejected manned lunar missions because of the hazards of solar flares and the tremendous launch propulsion requirements. He suggested that plans for an early manned lunar landing should be developed on an international basis.)

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(A Soviet scientist who heads the International Astronomical Union advanced the Soviet view that any attempted manned flight to the moon should be deferred at this time in favor of instrumented probes. He stated that the potential scientific results that might be obtained from a manned lunar landing do not justify the great expense.)

(It is possible that the Soviet statements indicate that the USSR has deferred its program for a manned lunar landing. The statements may also be intended to engender opposition among Western scientists to announced US intentions to land a man on the moon.)

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Argentina: President-elect Illia's first public policy pronouncement since his election was generally moderate and straightforward.

Illia emphasized that his government would be devoted to democratic principles and would try to develop Argentina through its own efforts. He said, however, that his government would encourage the influx of foreign capital.

On petroleum contracts, Illia flatly stated that his party regards all those negotiated by the Frondizi government to be illegal. However, in saying that only about 10 percent of the contracts seemed incompatible with the party's thinking, he held out hope that most can be renegotiated. According to the US Embassy, the three American oil companies engaged in exploration are the ones which can take the least comfort from what Illia had to say.

Illia criticized Cuba's servile imitation of a foreign totalitarian system and ideology. At the same time, he indicated that he would permit the recently outlawed Communist party to operate openly within Argentina. In this, he was reiterating his party's belief that communism could be combated more effectively by "positive democratic action."

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

*South Vietnam: Tension over the religious issue has increased sharply following the arrest of many Buddhists in Saigon yesterday. Buddhist leaders, who charge that the government plans sweeping repressive measures against their protest movement, are reported to be preparing new demonstrations in the northern city of Hué.

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North Vietnam - USSR: The arrival in Moscow on 5 August of Van Tien Dung, chief of staff of the North Vietnamese Army, provides the first opportunity in over six months for a high-level exchange of Vietnamese and Soviet views on military and political problems. Dung, primarily a political general, is an alternate member of Hanoi's politburo and a close associate of pro-Soviet Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. The North Vietnamese have recently moved more openly to Peiping's side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and have also shown concern that Moscow might sacrifice Hanoi's interest in South Vietnam.

*Burma: The Ne Win government is continuing to try to work out amnesty arrangements with various Communist and ethnic insurgent groups amid increasing political uncertainty. Communist front groups, in an effort to exploit the situation, are attempting to create a climate for national unity. The negotiations have stimulated new attacks on Ne Win's policies by rightist opposition groups.

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South Korea: (Former security chief Kim Chong-pil, currently in West Germany, may return to South Korea this month to manage the elections the regime has promised for this fall. Junta leader Pak Chong-hui, who wants to bring Kim back but fears the US reaction, is under strong pressure from Kim's supporters to allow him to return soon. New clashes are likely to occur within the junta if Kim returns. Reports of coup plotting are again circulating.)

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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